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This influence is most pronounced in the choice of financial restructuring strategies such as reducing
dividends or changing capital structure. We also examine if the way firms face financial distress affects the
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A firm’s lifecycle consists of birth, growth, maturity and decline. We examine the 
strategies firms choose when facing financial distress and present evidence that these choices 
are influenced by the corporate lifecycle. This influence is most pronounced in the choice of 
financial restructuring strategies such as reducing dividends or changing capital structure. We 
also examine if the way firms face financial distress affects the likelihood of recovery. We 
find that reducing investment and dividends are associated with recovery for all firms, but 
there is little influence of lifecycle. 
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Firms move through different stages of the corporate lifecycle as they grow and mature 
(Miller and Friesen 1984). Financial distress, default and bankruptcy are fundamental stages 
in the lifecycle of firms (Wruck 1990). This paper examines how firms at different stages of 
the corporate lifecycle face financial distress, and how the choice of financial restructuring 
strategies adopted in response are influenced by the corporate lifecycle.  
Our measure of distress is based on a firm’s distances-to-default (Merton, 1974). 
Falling distance-to-default metrics for a firm suggests that it is approaching default; 
increasing distances-to-default indicate that firms are less likely to default. A firm that moves 
towards default and then away again may be thought of as recovering. We find that firms take 
responsive actions when in financial distress. However, distinct lifecycle characteristics affect 
the choice of restructuring strategies these firms undertake. When we consider how firms face 
financial distress, we can also consider if their strategies affect the likelihood of recovery. We 
find that reducing investment and reducing dividends are associated with recovery for all 
firms. In contrast, issuing debt has a negative association with recovery. We find no 
association of lifecycle with the likelihood of recovery but some evidence that lifecycle and 
the choice of a strategy is associated with recovery. We also find evidence that adopting at 
least three strategies when confronting financial distress is associated with recovery. 
Adopting more than three strategies, however, has no significant association with recovery. 
For investors, firms engaging in distress motivated restructuring shows signs of 
performance improvement (Jensen, 1989; Whitaker, 1999). For managers, it is imperative 
that the right type of preventative measures are taken when they recognize that their firm is in 
distress. These restructuring strategies should be proper and appropriate for the stage of 
lifecycle the firm is in and hopefully, effective to turn the firm around from distress. For 
policymakers, there is a risk of managers of distress firms taking the wrong and lifecycle-
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inconsistent restructuring decisions that can be detrimental to macroeconomic and financial 
stability. Therefore, the importance of restructuring strategies in a firm’s recovery from 
distress forms the motivations of this paper. 
In Section 2 we discuss previous studies of lifecycle theory, financial distress and 
corporate turnaround strategies. In Section 3 we describe our data and sample selection. We 
present our analyses and findings in Sections 4 and 5, and our conclusions in Section 6. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Lifecycle theory 
Lifecycle theory suggests that appropriate growth and capital capacity strategies vary at 
different stages of a firm’s lifecycle (Anthony and Ramesh 1992), which consists of four 
stages: birth, growth, maturity and decline. Each stage exhibits significant differences in 
terms of situation, organizational strategy, structure, and decision-making style (Adizes 2004; 
Miller and Friesen 1984; Pashley and Philippatos 1990).  
Firms in the birth stage are typically small, dominated by their owners (entrepreneurs), 
simple, informal in structure, undifferentiated, and with highly centralized power systems and 
considerable focus on innovation (Miller and Friesen, 1984). These firms face significant 
uncertainty over future growth, which is manifested in higher book-to-market ratios and 
greater firm-specific risk (Lubos and Peitro 2003; Pastor and Veronesi 2003). Firms at the 
growth stage are typically medium sized with multiple shareholders, and achieving rapid 
growth. Managers are given more decision-making responsibility, and a separation of 
ownership and control begins to emerge (Miller and Friesen 1984; Mueller, 1972). Mature 
and decline firms are less likely to take on innovative or risky strategies than in their birth 
and growth stages. In these later stages, Mueller (1972) argues, internal fund flows eventually 
outpace investment opportunities and the cost of capital decreases as uncertainty is reduced. 
Mature firms aim for the smooth functioning of the business in a well-defined market (Miller 
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and Friesen 1984). Firms in decline are encroaching stagnation and suffer from low 
profitability (Miller and Friesen 1984) and predominantly adopt a ‘harvest’ strategy where 
the main aim is the collection of as much funds from existing operations as possible (Thietart 
and Vivas 1984).  
2.2. Financial distress and corporate turnaround strategies  
Chen, Weston, and Altman (1995) define distress as the condition where a firm’s 
liquidation of total assets is less than the total value of creditor claims. If prolonged, this 
situation can lead to forced liquidation or bankruptcy; for this reason, financial distress is 
often referred to as the likelihood of bankruptcy, which is dependent on the availability of 
liquidity and credit (Hendel 1996). When a firm recognizes that it is in danger of financial 
distress, it is vital that it responds immediately by taking corrective measures to enhance 
efficiency and control costs. Denis and Kruse (2000) find that, when a firm is in distress, 
restructuring is associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) provide four classifications of restructuring: managerial, 
operational, asset, and financial. Managerial restructuring includes replacement of senior 
management and/or the Chief Executive Officer. Managers whose poor planning or 
inefficient decision-making are considered the cause of financial distress may be replaced 
with new teams to assess the source of distress and implement strategies for turnaround 
(Lohrke, Beheian, and Palmer 2004); Pearce and Robbins (1993) stress the importance of 
management in turning distressed firms around. Denis and Kruse (2000) find that 36% of the 
sample firms they studied experienced such turnover in top executive positions following 
performance declines.  
Operational restructuring aims to restore profitability by controlling costs and reducing 
overheads through the sale of surplus fixed resources such as land, equipment and offices. By 
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decreasing input and maximizing output, firms can generate cash flow and enhance 
efficiency, at least in the short term: if used as a stand-alone strategy, it may not be enough to 
bring about recovery (Sudarsanam and Lai 2001), so is primarily a short-term fix to generate 
cash flow quickly. 
When a distressed firm sells off unprofitable or non-core lines of business, it is 
considered to be engaging in asset restructuring. This form of restructuring aims to realign 
the focus of the firm by reducing unrelated diversification and refocusing the business 
portfolio on core competencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Selling underperforming 
businesses allows their share of resources to be redeployed towards better uses; asset 
restructuring is therefore generally considered to be value-adding (Atanassov and Kim 2009). 
It has been found to play an important role for distressed firms as it provides both a source of 
funds and acts as a mechanism for creditors to obtain control over assets (Brown, James and 
Mooradian 1994).  
Financial restructuring generally refers to changes in a firm’s dividend policies or capital 
structure. It seeks to reduce payment pressures by employing equity-based and debt-based 
strategies. Equity-based strategies may involve dividend cuts or issuance of shares as a means 
to retain or generate funds; debt-based strategies include the adjustment of interest, debt 
maturity, or debt/equity ratio. Funds retained are then used to pay debt obligations. DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990) find that large firms are likely to respond to distress with rapid and 
aggressive dividend reductions.  
2.3. Restructuring effectiveness  
Various factors affect the success of restructuring strategies. Moulton and Thomas 
(1993) find that firm size dominates all other variables in successful reorganization. Barker 
and Duhaime (1997) argue that a successful turnaround depends on the firm’s ability to 
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change its strategy, structure, and ideology rather than on restructuring based on short-term 
efficiency or cost-cutting tactics. In particular, cost cutting and layoffs are found to be 
ineffectual by Denis and Kruse (2000), who consider that improvements in operating 
performance are mostly attributable to asset restructuring. 
3. DATA 
We investigate the implications of lifecycle theory on the choice of restructuring 
strategies in firms faced with distress. Our sample is constructed from US firm data available 
on CRSP and COMPUSTAT between 1995 and 2013. This period includes the Global 
Financial Crisis (Blinder, 2013) a time when firms faced considerable financial challenges. 
Our sample excludes firms in the utilities and financials industries since these operate in more 
regulated environments in terms of capital structure and operations. First, we classify our 
firms into their lifecycle stages. Next, we identify firms that are financially distressed and 
those that are not. Finally, we use a series of proxies to determine which restructuring 
strategies are used by our sample firms. 
3.1. Identification of lifecycle 
We adopt Anthony and Ramesh’s (1992) method1 of classifying firms into the four 
lifecycle classifications: birth, growth, maturity and decline, based on the following four 
lifecycle descriptors: annual dividends, scaled by income; percentage of sales growth; capital 
expenditure as a proportion of firm value; and the age of the firm: 





                                                 
1 Dickinson (2011) develops a firm-level life-cycle proxy based on the predicted behavior of operating investing 
and financing cash flows across different life cycle stages. We considered Dickinson’s method and our results 

















4. Age of the firm (AGE) 
DIVt is the common dividends for a firm in year t. IBEDt is the income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations in year t. SALESt is the net sales in year t. 
CEt is the capital expenditure in year t. VALUEt is the market value of equity plus book value 
debt at year t. Finally, AGEt is the number of years where information is available for the 
firm on CRSP/Compustat. Since industries vary in their dividend payment, sales growth, 
capital expenditure and age, we adapt Anthony and Ramesh’s (1992) approach by controlling 
for industry effects when grouping firms into the four lifecycle categories. We first calculate 
the four lifecycle descriptors for each year for each sample firm, then compute median values 
of the descriptors for each firm-year, using five years’ data (i.e., current year and the four 
previous years). Next, using Fama and French’s 49 industry grouping, we split the median 
values of the descriptors (for each industry) into quartiles and group the firms by lifecycle 
category. Once a firm-year is assigned to a category, it is given a score (median values less 
than Q1 = 1, between Q1 and less than Q2 = 2, between Q2 and less than Q3 = 3 and equal to 
Q3 and above = 4). We tally the scores for each firm-year and split all observations into 
quartiles again. Firms are finally categorized into a lifecycle classification based on the cut-
off values of the quartiles.  
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3.2. Identification of distress 
Capturing financial distress is central to our paper. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1994) argue that a firm is in distress if in any two consecutive years its earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are less than its reported expenses. 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) use Taffler’s Z-score and adopt a positive, positive, negative 
approach to define a financially distressed firm as one which has positive Z-scores in the two 
previous years and a negative Z-score in the current year.  
Accounting data records what has been, not what is expected. While we do not wish to 
enter into debate regarding the efficacy of financial statement analysis, the metrics discussed 
in the preceding paragraph may be insufficient because of their reliance on accounting data; 
therefore, we turn to option pricing theory and utilize a measure of the ex-ante likelihood of 
default.2 Merton (1974) models the value of a firm’s equity as a call option on its assets, an 
approach that allows the calculation of a firm’s distance-to-default, “…the number of 
standard deviation decreases in a firm’s asset value that it would take for the firm to default” 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, p.p. 1580-81). In calculating distance-to-default, we follow 
Bharath and Shumway (2008); the distribution of our estimates of distance-to-default and the 
probability of default are in keeping with Bharath and Shumway’s estimates. 
Distance-to-default does not, in itself, tell us when a firm is distressed. We determine if 
a firm is distressed by following Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and Sudarsanam 
and Lai (2001). We classify a firm as financially distressed when it has two consecutive years 
                                                 
2 Our study captures firms in extremis but not firms which have become bankrupt. Firms filing for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 7 cease business; the questions of lifecycle and strategy do not apply. If firms file under 
Chapter 11, they undertake measures to resolve their financial distress and questions of lifecycle and strategy 
may apply; however, they may not continue to trade publicly, so access to the variables that we require to 
compare them with those in our sample will not be systematically available. The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database (http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm) provides information about the largest US 
bankruptcies, but the data available is different from that required by the experimental design in this paper. We 
leave questions of strategy and lifecycle for these firms for future research. 
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of falling distance-to-default: for example, a firm that we classify as being in distress in 1995 
(the commencement of our sample period) will have had a declining distance-to-default in 
both 1994 and 1995. This approach is analogous to that of a climber approaching a precipice: 
she hopes her companions will pull her back to safety. In the same way, a firm approaching 
its default point should come under pressure from stakeholders to take action to reverse its 
direction.  
Table 1 presents the count of the number of distress firms and non-distress firms by the 
four lifecycle categories.3 Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of distressed firms across the sample 
period, showing a sharp increase in distress firms during three events: the 1997/1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis, the 2001/2002 tech-stock crash, and a spike during the 2007/2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.3. Types of restructuring strategies  
We investigate the four types of restructuring strategies, managerial, operational, asset, 
and financial.  
A firm is defined as engaging in managerial restructuring if it has replaced one of its 
top tier management: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Managing Director (MD). We 
obtained information on CEO or MD replacement from the S&P Executive Compensation 
database. As do Atanassov and Kim (2009), we consider managerial restructuring has 
occurred if a CEO or MD changes during the distress period (i.e., year t). The reason for 
leaving and age of the management are examined to ensure that a replacement is not due to 
death, illness, or retirement.  
                                                 
3 We remove outliers by trimming our sample at 5%, using Ln(Total Assets). 
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Operational and asset restructuring are generally the first broad strategies firms 
undertake. We look at a number of such strategies, including reducing investments, reducing 
the cost of goods sold (GOGS), laying off employees and selling off assets. As in Kang and 
Shivdasani (1997), the variable INV (ASSETS) denotes a strategy to reduce investments 
(fixed assets) and takes a value of 1 (zero otherwise) if a firm’s investing activities, proxied 
by COMPUSTAT item IVNCF (total (net) property, plant and equipment), falls more than 
15 percent between year t-1 and year t or year t+1, where year t is the observed firm-year; for 
distress firms, it is also the year of distress. For the strategy of reducing COGS, we follow 
Atanassov and Kim (2009), who deem this to be implemented if a firm’s COGS (scaled by 
Sales) is above the industry median in year t-1 but falls to the bottom quartile in year t or year 
t+1. A firm is deemed to have undertaken a strategy of laying off its employees if it has a 
more than 20 percent fall in the number of employees between year t-1 and year t or t+1 
(Denis and Kruse, 2000).  
Financial restructuring typically includes cutting or omitting dividends, issuing new 
security and exchanging debt for equity. Following Chen and Zhang (1998), we deem a firm 
to have undertaken financial restructuring if it experiences more than a 25 percent decrease in 
the total dividends paid between year t-1 and year t or t+1. We define a firm to have issued 
equity (debt) when the firm’s net equity (net debt) exceeds 5 percent of the book value of its 
total assets at year t (Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian, 2004). Table 2 presents the 
definitions of the variables discussed above. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4. LIFECYCLE THEORY, DISTRESS FIRMS AND RESTRUCTURING 
STRATEGIES 
As firms in the birth stage have highly centralized power structures (Miller and Friesen 
1984), it is likely that the managers are also the owners. This suggests that there will be little 
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external pressure for a change in management when such firms are in distress; firms in the 
birth stage are not likely to engage in managerial restructuring. However, as a firm moves 
along its lifecycle, its business structure becomes more complex, and it becomes more likely 
existing management may be replaced. We begin our analysis by examining if firms in the 
earlier lifecycle stages are less (or more) likely to use managerial restructuring than firms in 
later stages, by running a panel logistic regression with random effects. We utilize 
bootstrapped standard errors to ensure that the inferences we make about the estimated 
coefficients are robust; it is well known that the bootstrap results in consistent estimates of 
test statistics.4 The dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the CEO/MD has left the 

























BIRTH, GROWTH and MATURE are the lifecycle dummies that take the value 1 for 
the respective lifecycle stages and zero otherwise. FD is the dummy variable for a distress 
firm and takes the value of 1 if the firm is in distress and zero otherwise. We have also added 
a number of control variables: TobinsQ, LnTotalAssets, Institutional, Volatility, Return, 
Leverage and CashFlow. The first two are included to control for growth opportunities and 
firm size.5,6 Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find a positive relationship between outside 
blockholders and the probability of top management turnover in Japanese firms. Bethel and 
Liebeskind (1993) find that the prominence of managerial restructuring in the US in the late 
                                                 
4 See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for a discussion of bootstrapping.  
5 As mentioned in Section 2, Moulton and Thomas (1993) find that firm size dominates all other variables in 
predicting successful completion of reorganization.  
6 Our referee highlighted how intangible assets, as a proportion of total assets, might also affect the strategy 
employed by firms: for example, a growth firm may find it difficult to replace management whose special 
knowledge of key intangible assets is essential. Total assets per se may be a poor proxy for this effect, as firms 
cannot recognize internally generated intangibles. Further, our study spans a significant change in the way 
intangible assets are recognized (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2001a, 2001b). We leave the detailed 
consideration of any effect for future research. 
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1980s was a result of outside pressure by blockholders. As we expect that birth and growth 
firms are less likely to have outside blockholders or to be influenced by external shareholder 
pressure since there is a close manager–owner connection, we include institutional ownership 
as a control against biased results for our sample firms. Shumway (2001) suggests that stock 
returns and the volatility of a firm’s stock returns appear to be unambiguous proxies for the 
probability of the firm’s future failure; we include both as our risk-proxy variables. The 
theoretical frameworks by Black–Sholes–Merton (based on perfect market assumptions) 
demonstrate that, all else remaining constant, a firm’s risk of failure increases monotonically 
with leverage (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974); we therefore include leverage in our 
equations. Finally, we control for a firm’s cash flow, following Fitzpatrick and Ogden (2011) 
who find that net cash flow from operations is able to indicate financial distress of a firm. 
Table 3 presents the results for Equation 1. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 3 we find that distressed firms are more likely to change their CEO: the 
coefficient of FD is 0.0057 and significant. The lifecycle dummy variables, BIRTH, 
GROWTH, MATURE, are also significant, indicating that, in comparison with firms in 
decline (the base case for this and our subsequent analyses), firms are more likely to change 
their CEO at any time. The interactions of the lifecycle dummy variables with the financial 
distress dummy do not result in significant results. These findings suggest that the propensity 
for firms to change CEOs in times of distress bears no relationship to where they are in their 
lifecycle. 
We next examine if lifecycle theory has an impact on the types of operational/asset 
restructuring strategies undertaken by firms, with the following logistic regression with 





























We run the regression in Equation 2 four times, replacing the dependent variable each 
time with the various operational/asset restructuring strategies: (1) reducing investing 
activities (INV), (2) reducing cost of goods sold (COGS), (3) laying off employees (EMP) 
and (4) asset sales (ASSETS) where INV, COGS and EMP are the various types of 
operational restructuring strategies. If a firm engages in operational restructuring it may 
choose at least one of these strategies. To account for multiple strategies concurrently, we run 
a fifth regression with a dependent variable, OPS, which takes a value of 1 if at least one of 
the operational restructuring strategies has been employed and zero otherwise. Table 4 
reports our findings.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
While we focus on the interaction terms, it is worth noting that distress makes 
operational restructuring (saving by reducing COGS) more likely to take place; the distress 
dummy, FD, is positive and significant in all equations with the exception of COGS. 
Contraction policies such as reducing COGS may not be viable for a firm in distress; it may 
be more practical for them to adopt expansion policies and aggressively increase their sales 
(John, Lang and Netter, 1992).  
We also find that birth firms in distress are less likely to reduce COGS than decline 
firms in distress. The coefficient of the interaction of BIRTH and FD is -0.0220 and is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Logistic regressions allow the calculation of 
odds ratios.7 We do not report odds ratios in the tables but the odds ratios associated with the 
                                                 
7 When a logistic regression is calculated, the regression coefficient (b1) is the estimated increase in the log odds 
of the outcome per unit increase in the value of the exposure. In other words, the exponential function of the 




independent variables are supportive of the conclusions we draw on the basis of the estimated 
coefficients. The odds ratio for the interaction of BIRTH and FD of 0.1916 is less than 1, 
indicating that, compared to decline firms in distress, the odds of birth firms in distress not 
engaging in reducing COGS increase by a factor of 5.2192 (all other factors being equal). 
When we examine the regression result for firms that engage in other operational 
restructuring, we find that birth, growth and mature firms are all likely to reduce the number 
of employees when they are in distress. In Column 3, the coefficients of the interactions of 
these lifecycle dummies with FD are 0.0980, 0.0496 and 0.0477 respectively. The respective 
odds ratios of 1.5497, 1.2733 and 1.4318, indicate that, compared with decline firms in 
distress, the odds of birth, growth and mature firms in distress engaging in employee 
restructuring increase by the same factor (all other factors being equal). Reduction of 
employees, described as “belt-tightening” or “fire-fighting”, aims to produce a “quick-win”, 
either to stabilize finances in the short term until more complex strategies are devised or to 
improve cash flow quickly (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Sudarsanam and 
Lai, 2001). Compared to decline firms in distress, distressed firms in the earlier lifecycle 
stages are more likely to retrench employees. This strategy can be quickly implemented, may 
have an almost immediate effect, and generally requires little or no capital or resource outlay 
(Hofer, 1980; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Distressed decline firms, on the other hand, are 
forced to be risk averse in their strategies as they cannot sustain potential losses, and 
employee reduction restructuring carries risks that morale and commitment will be reduced. 
This may increase staff turnover, including key employees who are essential if the firm is to 
turn around (Barker and Mone, 1994).  
                                                                                                                                                        
ratio represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the 
outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure (Szumilas, 2010).  
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In Column 4 of Table 5 we find that the FD coefficient of 0.1080 is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; firms in distress are likely to engage in at least one of the 
operational restructuring strategies. However, we do not find significant results for the 
interactions of the lifecycle dummies and FD. 
Lifecycle theory suggests that younger firms are typically small, with a limited range of 
product lines, and focused on expansion: they are unlikely to engage in asset restructuring. In 
Column 5 of Table 4, we find that younger firms in distress are no different from the base 
case (decline firms) in their resort to asset restructuring in times of distress (the coefficients 
of the interactions of BIRTH and FD and GROWTH and FD are not significant). Birth, 
growth and decline firms in distress are therefore likely to retain their assets, to collect as 
much funds from existing operations as possible, and their creditors are likely to place 
restrictions on asset disposal for fear of being unable to recover debts. Mature firms, on the 
other hand, are more likely to engage in asset restructuring: the coefficient of the interaction 
firm is 0.0226 and significant at the 10 percent level. This behavior is consistent with the 
notion that these  mature firms are focused on efficiency (Miller and Friesen 1984) and can 
redeploy resources from the sale of underperforming businesses to better ends (Atanassov 
and Kim 2009). 
Finally, to examine if distress firms in the earlier lifecycle stages are less (or more) 
likely to use financial restructuring strategies than firms in the later stages, we run the 



























We run the regression with three separate dependent variables: reduction of dividend 
(DIV), issuing of debt (NetDebt) and issuing of equity (NetEquity). As with operational 
restructuring, a firm engaged in financial restructuring may choose either one or a 
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combination of strategies; to account for this we also run a fourth regression with a FIN 
dependent variable. FIN takes a value of one if at least one of the financial restructuring 
strategies has been employed, and zero otherwise. Table 5 presents the results for the 
financial restructuring. As we noted when discussing Table 4, we find that the distress 
dummy, FD, is positive and significant in all equations: distress makes it more likely that 
firms will engage in financial restructuring. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We find persuasive evidence supporting the lifecycle theory. Birth, growth and mature 
firms in distress are all unlikely to reduce dividends. The coefficients of the interactions of 
these lifecycle dummies with FD are -0.0850, -0.0489 and -0.0411 respectively. The 
respective odd ratios of 0.3951, 0.6953 and 0.7356 are all less than 1, indicating that, 
compared with decline firms in distress, the odds of birth, growth and mature firms in distress 
not engaging in reducing dividends increase by factors of 2.5310, 1.4382 and 1.3594 
respectively, all other factors being equal. This finding suggests that decline firms in distress 
have a propensity to reduce dividends to preserve funds for keeping themselves afloat 
(Mueller 1972; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990). 
In Column 2 of Table 5, we find that the interaction of BIRTH and FD is -0.0602 and 
significant at the 5 percent level. Compared with firms at other stages of the lifecycle, those 
in the birth stage are less likely to issue debt. They are in the initial stages of operation, often 
struggling to remain viable against competition from older, more established firms; they tend 
to have an entrepreneurial focus with a risk-taking strategic approach; their future cash flows 
are uncertain: the market tends to consider such firms risky (Lubos and Peitro, 2003; Miller 
and Friesen, 1984; Pastor and Veronesi, 2003). While birth firms may require debt liquidity 
to survive the distress, given their more risky nature, these qualities means that lenders of 
funds are unlikely to lend to them, so making it difficult for them to issue debts. 
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In Column 3 of Table 5, we find that firms in distress are less likely to raise funding 
through issuing equity. The FD coefficient of -0.0138 is significant at the 1 percent level. 
This finding contradicts the pecking order hypothesis that firms will resort to raising external 
funds through the issuance of equity when in distress; and when we analyze the interaction 
variables, we find that distressed mature firms are less likely to raise equity than firms at 
other stages of their lifecycle. The coefficient of the interaction of MATURE and FD is -
0.0167 and is significant at the 5 percent level; the odds of mature firms in distress not 
issuing equity increase by a factor of 1.3349. One explanation for distressed mature firms not 
raising new equity (relative to firms in other lifecycle stages) is that they are likely to have 
fewer investment opportunities (Mueller, 1972). Investors may also avoid investing in them. 
In Column 4 of Table 5, we examine FIN, a variable that takes a value of one if at least 
one of the financial restructuring strategies has been employed and zero otherwise. Firms in 
distress are likely to employ financial restructuring strategies; the coefficient of FD is 0.1537 
and is significant at the 1 percent level. However, the coefficients of the interactions of these 
lifecycle dummies with FD for birth, growth and mature firms are  -0.1101, -0.0449 and -
0.028 and the odds ratios are 0.5859, 0.8223 and 0.7337: compared with decline firms in 
distress, the odds of younger firms not engaging in financial restructuring strategies increase 
by factors of 1.7068, 1.2161 and 1.3630. Decline firms in distress are likely to be aggressive 
in financial restructuring as shrinking markets, drop in demand and lack of innovation 
contribute to ever-declining sales.  
5. RESTRUCTURING EFFECTIVENESS 
In the preceding section we provide some evidence that is consistent with the lifecycle 
theory. Depending on their stage of the lifecycle, firms in distress prefer certain restructuring 
strategies. However, the ability to engage in a strategy does not necessarily ensure a 
successful turnaround. Firms may continue to falter and may eventually file for bankruptcy. 
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For our sample of firms in distress only, we examine the effectiveness of restructuring 
strategies. In order to be consistent with our previous definition of a distressed firm, we 
define a “recovered” firm as one that increases its distance-to-default in two consecutive 
years: for example, a distress firm in 1995 is deemed to have turned around if its distance-to-
default increases in both 1996 and 1997. We present a simple summary of the strategies firms 
undertake and their relationship with recovery in Table 6. There is prima facie evidence that 
reducing dividends, selling assets and reducing employees have a slightly higher association 
with recovery. However, in order to rigorously test the relationships of strategies to recovery, 
we follow the procedure we have used previously in the paper and run the following logistic 
regression with bootstrapped standard errors to examine the effectiveness of restructuring 

































The dependent variable, Recovery, takes the value 1 if a distress firm recovers and zero 
otherwise. The independent variable, Restructurings, represents managerial, operational/asset 
and financial restructuring strategies, examined in the previous section. Table 7 presents the 
results on the effectiveness of restructuring strategies.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
When examining the effectiveness of managerial restructuring strategy in Column 1 of 
Table 7, we find that birth firms are more likely to recover if they replace their incompetent 
management. The coefficient of 0.4472 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Compared with older firms, birth firms are in their infancy and commencing their business 
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operations. Their business structure and operations will be less complex and it may be 
relatively easy for a new management team to turn the company around.  
We next examine the effectiveness of operational restructuring strategies in Columns 2, 
3 and 4 of Table 7. Operational restructuring strategies are primarily a short-term “fix”, and 
both Barker and Duhaime (1997) and Denis and Kruse (2000) suggest that operational 
restructuring strategies are ineffectual. Confirming this notion, there are only two significant 
results for operational restructuring strategies. In Column 2, the coefficient for 
RESTRUCTURING of 0.0578 is significant at the 1 percent level; firms in distress that 
engaged in investment reduction increase their chances of survival. However, there is no 
difference across the different stage of corporate lifecycles. There is also no relationship 
between firms in distress that undertook reduction of COGS and employees and the route to 
recovery. In Column 3 we find that the statistically significant interaction of MATURE and 
COGS is consistent with past studies. Boyne and Meier (2009), for example, present evidence 
that firms are unsuccessful in turnaround efforts when they over-pursue cost efficiencies, and 
may actually exacerbate the decline.  
In Column 5 of Table 7, we also find that asset restructuring strategy is also not an 
effective restructuring strategy (ASSETS, and the interaction of ASSETS with the lifecycle 
dummies, are insignificant). When we analyze the effectiveness of the financial restructuring 
strategies in Columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 7, we find that the coefficient for birth firms that 
cut or omit dividends is -0.3108 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level): cutting or 
omitting dividends will not revive birth firms in distress; nor is there evidence that other 
financial restructuring strategies are effective. The findings regarding debt and equity 
(Columns 7 and 8) are instructive. Pecking order theory predicts that, when precluded from 
other alternatives, a firm has no option but to issue equity, especially when in financial 
distress. However, adverse selection by buyers means that the firm has to issue the new 
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equity at heavily discounted prices, and the cost of doing this may be too great to provide 
enough cash flow to reverse the distress. 
So far we have explored the effectiveness of the four restructuring strategies as if they were 
mutually exclusive, but distress firms may well adopt multiple restructuring strategies 
concurrently. We therefore extend our effectiveness analysis to include circumstances where 
a distress firm adopts more than one type of strategy. We run the following logistic regression 
with bootstrapped standard errors to examine the success of recovering from financial distress 

































There are eight possible recovery strategies under the managerial, operational, assets 
and financial restructuring. We run four separate regressions to examine the effectiveness of a 
distress firm undertaking at least two, three, four, or five strategies concurrently. For each 
regression, the “NumStrategies” variable takes the value of 1 when the firm adapts the 
number of strategies under the regressed scenario, and zero otherwise. Table 8 presents the 
results. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we find that NumStrategies is significant for all firms 
when at least 2 and 3 strategies are attempted. The coefficient of NumStrategies is 0.0486 
(significant at the 5 percent level) in Column 1 when two or more strategies are undertaken. 
The coefficient of NumStrategies is 0.0554 (significant at the 10 percent level) in Column 2 
when three or more strategies are undertaken. We do not find significance when four or more 
strategies are attempted (Columns 3 and 4). We also find that when five or more strategies 
are attempted (Column 4) by a distressed birth firm, the interacting coefficient is negative, -
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0.3659, and significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that firms are less likely to 
recover from distress despite undertaking multiple restructuring strategies—that undertaking 
too many strategies is detrimental.  
The analyses in Tables 7 and 8 provide some insight into the contribution of strategies, 
lifecycle and the interaction of lifecycle and strategies in recovery. The logistic regressions, 
as we have noted, facilitate the calculation of odds ratios.8 In Panel A of Table 9 we present 
the odds ratios associated with estimates presented for strategies, and the interaction of those 
strategies with the lifecycle dummy variables, that we reported in Table 7. In Panel B of 
Table 9 with we present the odds ratios associated with the estimates reported in Table 8. For 
all firms Panel A of Table 9 indicates that reducing investment activities (INV) and reducing 
dividends (DIV) have statistically significant positive associations with recovery; and altering 
capital structure by increasing debt (NetDebt) reduces the likelihood of recovery. In keeping 
with the results for birth firms reported in Table 7, in Panel A of Table 9 we find that there is 
a higher likelihood of recovery for birth who remove their CEO or who reduce their dividend 
ceteris paribus. Consistent with our findings in Table 8, undertaking at least two or at least 
three strategies is found to have a positive association with recovery but no association is 
found for four or more strategies. 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
6. CONCLUSION 
When firms approach default, shareholders may pressure management to take action to 
turn the firm around. Creditors may also demand corrective measures, especially when debt 
covenants may be violated. While the choice of corrective measures is made by management, 
these may be constrained by the firm’s stage in the corporate lifecycle.  
                                                 
8 See footnote 7 for a short discussion of odds ratios. 
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We examine the implications of the lifecycle theory on how distressed firms choose 
their restructuring strategies and find evidence that distress firms’ recourse to different types 
of restructuring strategies is influenced by the stage of the lifecycle they are in. We find that 
firms in earlier stages of the lifecycle have a tendency to reduce their employees; mature 
firms are more likely to engage in asset restructuring. The influence of lifecycle is most 
pronounced in the choice of financial restructuring strategies such as reducing dividends or 
varying capital structures. 
Even for those who are able to implement these strategies, there is no assurance that 
the strategies will be effective in turning the firm around. Our analyses suggest that reducing 
investment and dividends have a positive association with recovery for all firms regardless of 
where they are in the lifecycle. Increasing debt reduces the likelihood of recovery. There is 
also some evidence that the interaction of lifecycle and the choice of strategy is associated 
with recovery. We find it instructive that adopting less, rather than more, strategies, is 
associated with recovery. Adopting at least three strategies when confronting financial 
distress is associated with recovery. Adopting more than three strategies, however, has no 
significant association with recovery. 
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Breakdown of the number of distress firm-year observations and non-distress firm-year 
observations by the four lifecycle categories. 
 Distress Firms Non-Distress Firms Total 
Birth 175 1311 1486 
Growth 808 4484 5292 
Mature 1486 6958 8444 
Decline 2803 10322 13125 




Definition of Variables. 
Dependent Variables 
CEOit = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is 
replaced and zero otherwise. 
INVit = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the firm experiences more 
than 15% decrease in investment activities from year t-1 to year t or t+1 
and zero otherwise. 
COGSit
 = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the firm’s [Cost of goods 
sold/Sales] is initially above the industry median at year t-1 and falls to 
the bottom quartile of its industry in year t or year t+1 and zero 
otherwise. 
EMPit
 = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the firm experiences more 
than 20% drop in the number of employees from year t-1 to year t or 
t+1 and zero otherwise. 
ASSETSit
 = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the firm experiences more 
than 15% drop in its total property, plant and equipment (net) from year 
t-1 to year t or t+1 and zero otherwise.  
DIVit
 = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if the firm experiences more 
than 25% drop in its total dividends from year t-1 to year t or t+1 and 
zero otherwise. 
NetDebtit = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if Net Debt exceeds 5% of the 
book value of total asset at year t or t+1 and zero otherwise. Net Debt is 
measured by Compustat item: DLTIS (Data 111) less DLTR (Data 
114). 
Net Equityit
 = Dummy variable where it is equal to 1 if Net Equity exceeds 5% of the 
book value of total asset at year t or t+1 and zero otherwise. Net Equity 











= Market capitalization + Total Asset – Common/Ordinary Equity, scaled 
by total assets at year t. 
LnTotal Assetsit 
 
= Natural logarithm of company i's total asset at year t. 
Institutionalit
 = The proportion of shares held by institutional investors reported in file 
s13 at year t.  
Volatilityit
 = Standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of year t. 
Returnit
 = Mean of the monthly stock returns of year t. 
Leverageit
 = The ratio of book value of long term debt divided by the value of the 
firm at year t. The value of the firm is the sum of market capitalization 
and the book value of long term debt. 
CashFlowit





Management Restructuring: The dependent variable (CEO) takes the value of 1 when 
managerial restructuring occurred and zero otherwise. Birth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in 
this stage and zero otherwise. Growth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero 
otherwise. Mature takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. FD takes 
the value of 1 if a firm is in financial distress and zero otherwise. TobinsQ is measured by 
Market capitalization + Total Asset - Common/Ordinary Equity, scaled by total assets. 
LnTotalAssets is measured by Ln(Total Assets). Institutional is measured by the total share 
holdings held by institutional investors, scaled by the total outstanding shares. Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. Return is the mean of the monthly stock 
returns. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of long term debt divided by the value of the 
firm. CashFlow is the ratio of net cash flow from operations divided by total assets. The 
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 






















MATURE *FD 0.0032 
 (0.0053) 
 
TOBIN’S Q 0.0007* 
 (0.0004) 
 


















   
χ2 116.56***  







Operational restructuring/asset restructuring: The dependent variable (Restructuring) takes 
the value of 1 when operational (asset) restructuring occurred and zero otherwise. 
Restructuring includes reducing investing activities (INV), reducing the cost of goods sold 
(COGS), laying off employees (EMP) and asset sales (ASSETS). The dependent variable 
“OPS” takes the value of 1 when at least one type of operational restructuring occurred and 
zero otherwise. Definitions of restructuring are in Table 2. Birth takes the value of 1 if a firm 
is in this stage and zero otherwise. Growth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and 
zero otherwise. Mature takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. FD 
takes the value of 1 if a firm is in financial distress and zero otherwise. TobinsQ is measured 
by (Market capitalization) + Total Asset - Common/Ordinary Equity, scaled by total assets. 
LnTotalAssets is measured by Ln(Total Assets). Institutional is measured by the total share 
holdings held by institutional investors, scaled by the total outstanding shares. Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. Return is the mean of the monthly stock 
returns. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of long term debt divided by the value of the 
firm. CashFlow is the ratio of net cash flow from operations divided by total assets. The 
bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 

















































































































































































       
χ2 835.32*** 75.42*** 719.94*** 1026.74*** 1278.61***  





Financial restructuring: The dependent variable (Restructuring) takes the value of 1 when financial 
restructuring occurred and zero otherwise. Restructuring includes dividend cuts (DIV), issue of debt 
(NetDebt) and issue of equity (NetEquity). The dependent variable “FIN” takes the value of 1 when at 
least one type of financial restructuring occurred and zero otherwise. Definitions of the restructurings 
are in Table 2. Birth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Growth takes the 
value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Mature takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this 
stage and zero otherwise. FD takes the value of 1 if a firm is in financial distress and zero otherwise. 
TobinsQ is measured by (Market capitalization) + Total Asset - Common/Ordinary Equity, scaled by 
total assets. Total Assets is measured by Ln(Total Assets). Institutional is measured by the total 
shareholdings held by institutional investors, scaled by the total outstanding shares. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. Return is the mean of the monthly stock returns. 
Leverage is the ratio of the book value of long term debt divided by the value of the firm. CashFlow is 
the ratio of net cash flow from operations divided by total assets. The bootstrapped standard errors are 

































































































































     
χ2 277.11*** 563.25*** 792.60*** 837.33*** 






Restructuring strategies: This table presents numbers of firms choosing a strategy, (the column headed “chosen”), the number of firms that recover and the 
percentage of firms which recover for firms in each of the four lifecycle stages as well as all firms. A firm is considered as having “recovered” firm when it 
increases its distance-to-default in two consecutive years following a period of distress. The types of restructuring strategies are defined in Table 2. 
 



















CEO 4 3 75% 24 6 25% 39 11 28% 67 20 30% 134 40 30% 
INV 111 29 26% 553 207 37% 896 312 35% 1695 617 36% 3255 1165 36% 
COGS 0 0 - 13 3 23% 17 3 18% 34 16 47% 64 22 34% 
EMP 43 12 28% 157 61 39% 235 92 39% 282 108 38% 717 273 38% 
Assets 48 20 42% 219 91 42% 307 111 36% 362 136 38% 936 358 38% 
Div 12 1 8% 68 26 38% 142 53 37% 442 186 42% 664 266 40% 
NetDebts 22 7 32% 174 48 28% 327 111 34% 635 194 31% 1158 360 31% 






Effectiveness of the restructuring strategies: The dependent variable (Recovery) takes the value of 1 when a distress firm increases its distance-to-default 
in two consecutive years following the distress year, and zero otherwise. Birth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Growth takes 
the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Mature takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Restructuring includes 
managerial, operational/assets and financial restructuring. Definitions of restructuring are in Table 2. TobinsQ is measured by (Market capitalization) + Total 
Asset - Common/Ordinary Equity, scaled by total assets. TotalAssets is measured by Ln(Total Assets). Institutional is measured by the total share holdings 
held by institutional investors, scaled by the total outstanding shares. Volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. Return is the mean of 
the monthly stock returns. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of long term debt divided by the value of the firm. CashFlow is the ratio of net cash flow 


































































































































































































































































         
χ2 71.18*** 87.42*** 72.01*** 76.82*** 78.92*** 88.59*** 84.40*** 68.83*** 





Combination of restructuring strategies: The dependent variable (Recovery) takes the value of 1 when a 
financial distress firm increases its distance-to-default in two consecutive years followed the distress year, 
and zero otherwise. Birth takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Growth takes the 
value of 1 if a firm is in this stage and zero otherwise. Mature takes the value of 1 if a firm is in this stage 
and zero otherwise. There are eight recovery strategies that may be undertaken by distress firms under the 
managerial, operational, assets and financial restructuring. NumStrategies takes the value of 1 when at least 
2, 3, or 4 recovery strategies are undertaken concurrently, and zero otherwise. Definitions of restructuring 
are in Table 2. TobinsQ is measured by (Market capitalization) + Total Asset - Common/Ordinary Equity, 
scaled by total assets. LnTotalAssets is measured by Ln(Total Assets). Institutional is measured by the total 
share holdings held by institutional investors, scaled by the total outstanding shares. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. Return is the mean of the monthly stock returns. Leverage 
is the ratio of the book value of long term debt divided by the value of the firm. CashFlow is the ratio of net 
cash flow from operations divided by total assets. The bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 (1) 
At least 2 
strategies 
(2) 
At least 3 
strategies  
(3) 
At least 4 
strategies  
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Odds ratios for restructuring strategies: This table presents the odds ratios associated with the estimates of presented in Table 7 (Panel A) and 























1.6794 1.0932 1.0616 1.3002*** 0.8926* 1.0382 
Birth * Restructuring 
 
7.5660* 0.4884 Omitted 0.7186 1.9586 0.1461*** 1.7543 1.3754 
Growth * Restructuring 
 
0.6651 1.3636 0.3610 1.0941 1.3345 0.8165 0.8165 1.4840 
Mature * Restructuring 
 
0.9178 0.9081 0.2557** 1.1715 1.0082 0.8999 1.2370 1.3366 
Panel B 
 (1) 
At least 2 
Strategies 
(2) 
At least 3 
Strategies 
(3) 
At least 4 
Strategies 
(4) 
At least 5 
Strategies 
NumStrategies 1.2109** 1.2434* 1.0744 1.7730 
Birth * NumStrategies 0.6510 1.6666 2.0396 1.000* 
Growth * NumStrategies 1.1017 0.9292 1.0173 1.5140 






































Birth Growth Mature Decline
